There are some interesting contrasting views regarding the relationship between aesthetics and morality in the readings for this week. In Weber’s article “Religious Ethics and the world: Sexuality and Art” he uses terminology such as “sexual intoxication” “orgy” and states that “the erotic orgy appears in religion as an undesired consequence of ecstasy produced by other orgiastic means, particularly dance” and makes the unexplained assumption that temple dancers were simply “temple prostitutes”. In terms of spirituality he states that this “state of sexual orgy” can be sublimated into erotic love of god.
In Weber’s view the primary group against this eroticism are the mystics and ascetics who adhere to various forms of chastity (anti sex). Chastity for these religious practitioners is the highest type of behavior that acts as a vehicle for the development of abilities that allow access to the “divine”. It is also links to renunciation of the world and its pleasures among them sexuality (bodily pleasure) and states that for example for the Hindu ascetic the rejection of all sexual relations was a pre-requisite for complete salvation. . In terms of the fundamental primitive force that binds one to the world is grasping at sexual pleasure. Another interesting point Weber makes regarding the ascetic life is that it is based on rigid control and he defines the sexual act as “”ultimately and uniquely unsusceptible to rational organization. He concludes that as a result of this äll non prophetic priestly systematization of religion without exception concern themselves with sexuality from such motives…..terminating in hostility toward sexuality”
In terms of art, art and religion were originally inextricably linked, in the structures of temple, images and icons, religious music and dance. The separation of the two in Weber’s opinion is tied to the independent nature of artistic expression when it is appreciated intellectually rather than through pure religious sentiment. He terms this the “religious devaluation of art”.
By contrast Paul Guyer’s article “The Origins of Modern aesthetics: 1711-35” begins with Baumgarten and his “naming of “the subject of aesthetics defining it as “the art of thinking beautifully, the science of sentive cognition)”. From this standpoint the discussion focuses on beauty, the sublime in both art and nature. In terms of Kant’s moral philosophy the aspect of the freedom of the imagination, the moral freedom to conduct ourselves autonomously by a law legislated by our reason. In terms of the enjoyment of pleasure in nature and aesthetics this experience of beauty itself is seen as a symbol of marality, it is both the manifestation of the freedom of the imagination and the representation of freedom as an expression of the imagination.
The very antithesis to the dichotomy of aesthetics and ascetics is posited by Shaftesbury who held the view that the very pleasure of beauty and virtue was a natural reflection of our response to the order of the cosmos and our love for forms of beauty and virtue, order and proportion is not simply an admiration of the object itself but rather the crative intelligence, the divine intelligence which is behind this manifestation, even behind the human creator and is a natural response to the underlying divine intelligence.
The interesting restraint is that in this discussion the pleasure associated with physical pleasure and sexuality, in other words the ecstatic is not specifically addressed but rather the more formal and intellectual aspects of aesthetic appreciation so the two discussions do not have the same ground for either resolution or direct analogy of argument. It is Wolterstorff’s article that most clearly tries to resolve this issue of the art and religion. Art is seen as transcendent in the sense that the evocation of aesthetic emotions such as joy begins from beautiful form and results in aesthetic exaltation”. The form expresses the emotion of the creator as being inspired by “pure forms” which are a reflections of ultimate reality “the god in everything”. Art is therefore akin to religion. The physical universe for the mystic as for the artist is a means to ecstasy.
So in the end we are back at the beginning and are left with the puzzle is ecstasy transcendent or primitive…? Does the transcendence reached through the objects of the world fundamentally differ from the transcendence reached through renunciation of the objects of the world?
Wednesday, April 9, 2008
Tuesday, April 8, 2008
Poor Sex = Sex; Rich Sex = Chastity?
In his article “Religious Ethics and the World: Sexuality and Art,” Max Weber does some fancy footwork around the concepts of religion, sexuality and art.
On the topic of sexuality versus religiosity, Weber equates sexual intoxication with religious behaviour. Specifically, he comments that sex is the religion of the primitive masses. However, through the development of social norms, the ecstasy of religious practices is produced by orgiastic means other than sex, for instance dance. This causes the erotic experience to be labeled as an unfortunate side effect of an otherwise sexless act.
Consequently, chastity is promoted as a charismatic quality and a source of valuable ecstatic abilities (tapas, if you will). By shunning sexuality, man is transcending his baser animal instincts to partake in sexual activities. Furthermore, it is promoted, that man is allowed to focus on more important ideals if his mind and body aren’t corrupted by sex.
A comment on the sex-negative attitude promoted by most world religions: isn’t it a tad bit hypocritical of the prophet Mohammed to have denounced sexuality while garnering for himself the boon of multiple (with no limit on number) wives? Just a thought!
Weber addresses the notion that salvation can only come through complete rejection of all sexual relations. This means that the majority of people will never attain salvation for their earthly choice to be married, become parents, or simply indulge in the sexual act! Women, being the eternal bearers of sex and the pollution it brings, are regarded as the vessels of this “whoredom”! Weber suggests that while a particular woman might be regarded as sacred, the entire female sex is still considered polluted. I don’t comprehend how it is ‘logical’ for women to be this treacherous vessels of depravity, and yet be considered vital to the furthering of the species! It’s a contradiction; however, I suppose the blame has to land somewhere!!!
In keeping with this disdainful view of sexual activity, marriage is regarded as a means to an end – a legal method of producing and rearing children for a labour force, and performers of the funeral rites. There is no erotic value attached to the marital bond. In fact, Weber later goes on to state that Luther (of Protestantism fame) regarded sexual expression within a marriage as the lesser evil when pitted against the sins of whoredom – which apparently is the inevitable end if marriage didn’t exist. And of course all the whores would be women who would lure the otherwise chaste men away from their lofty ideals!
Weber goes on to state that sex is for the peasant, while the more evolved person is in pursuit of higher ideals.
On the topic of sexuality versus religiosity, Weber equates sexual intoxication with religious behaviour. Specifically, he comments that sex is the religion of the primitive masses. However, through the development of social norms, the ecstasy of religious practices is produced by orgiastic means other than sex, for instance dance. This causes the erotic experience to be labeled as an unfortunate side effect of an otherwise sexless act.
Consequently, chastity is promoted as a charismatic quality and a source of valuable ecstatic abilities (tapas, if you will). By shunning sexuality, man is transcending his baser animal instincts to partake in sexual activities. Furthermore, it is promoted, that man is allowed to focus on more important ideals if his mind and body aren’t corrupted by sex.
A comment on the sex-negative attitude promoted by most world religions: isn’t it a tad bit hypocritical of the prophet Mohammed to have denounced sexuality while garnering for himself the boon of multiple (with no limit on number) wives? Just a thought!
Weber addresses the notion that salvation can only come through complete rejection of all sexual relations. This means that the majority of people will never attain salvation for their earthly choice to be married, become parents, or simply indulge in the sexual act! Women, being the eternal bearers of sex and the pollution it brings, are regarded as the vessels of this “whoredom”! Weber suggests that while a particular woman might be regarded as sacred, the entire female sex is still considered polluted. I don’t comprehend how it is ‘logical’ for women to be this treacherous vessels of depravity, and yet be considered vital to the furthering of the species! It’s a contradiction; however, I suppose the blame has to land somewhere!!!
In keeping with this disdainful view of sexual activity, marriage is regarded as a means to an end – a legal method of producing and rearing children for a labour force, and performers of the funeral rites. There is no erotic value attached to the marital bond. In fact, Weber later goes on to state that Luther (of Protestantism fame) regarded sexual expression within a marriage as the lesser evil when pitted against the sins of whoredom – which apparently is the inevitable end if marriage didn’t exist. And of course all the whores would be women who would lure the otherwise chaste men away from their lofty ideals!
Weber goes on to state that sex is for the peasant, while the more evolved person is in pursuit of higher ideals.
Sexual Orgies Equated with Religious Goals
Weber’s article was very striking and what I chose to do my presentation on, so I will highlight some interesting points. In his article Weber attempts to show how with the introduction of social institutions and normative orders (social norms), certain things are given different meanings. He discusses sexual evolution in this light. He argues that sexual orgies are sublimated into eroticism in the light of social conventions. This eroticism fulfills the same physiological needs that sexual orgies fulfill but are now made appropriate. The fact that the sexual orgy can be sublimated is the very way in which it can transcend everyday life. Wolterstorff quotes Bell and states, “when we consider anything as an end in itself we become aware of that in it which is of greater moment than any qualities it may of acquired from keeping company with human beings”. (327) Although, Wolterstorff is eluding to the fact that forms or objects are ultimately one independent of it multiple characteristics, I think that one can relate it to Weber’s discussion. More precisely, the sexual orgy becomes something greater when it transcends everyday life.
Further, it appears to me that the religious orgies that Weber make reference to is in fact related to a heightened sense of joy or liberation much like that experienced by the ascetic or mystic. Could this be the ultimate goal that rasa is suppose to being in poetry? What I find particularly interesting is the fact that in this section of his work, is how the aesthetics dimension is very integral to religious traditions. More particularly sexual orgies which are usually a part of the art world are closely related to eliciting religious responses and emotions.
This is cleverly connected to his section on Religion and art in which he shows how in the beginning religion and art are seen as together, and then later in time when art begins to have its own distinct categories and becomes a study for the academics, religion no longer is in dialogue with it. He goes on to clarify that religion becomes irrational in the eyes of the aesthetic academic and vice versa. This idea of what is irrational and rational clearly plays a role in the evolution of social conventions. I believe he attempts to illustrate that with secularism religion becomes more irrational. As a result he highlights how religion and aesthetics once attached are collapsed as a result of historical processes. What becomes religious is no longer aesthetics and vice versa.
Lastly, his discussion of women is very intriguing. Weber discusses how women were in fact the cause of sexual energies because if they were not created then man in fact would not feel sexual urges (this he illustrates in a negative light). If in fact this is the case then there should have been no reason why women were looked down upon in society today. More specifically, Weber gives sexual energies a positive twist in his article by relating it to religious goals and experiences. One could simply say that women then were the very cause of religion because they gave off the energy needed for a heightened religious experience.
There is only one predominant question in my mind. In Weber’s article, it seems that religion and aesthetics are a part of a specific formula or has a specific structure, what happens when this structure collapses? In other words, what shifts would we see in these terms? Would they be different from its primitive meanings or the same?
Quick Note: Good Luck to everybody in their future endeavors!
Further, it appears to me that the religious orgies that Weber make reference to is in fact related to a heightened sense of joy or liberation much like that experienced by the ascetic or mystic. Could this be the ultimate goal that rasa is suppose to being in poetry? What I find particularly interesting is the fact that in this section of his work, is how the aesthetics dimension is very integral to religious traditions. More particularly sexual orgies which are usually a part of the art world are closely related to eliciting religious responses and emotions.
This is cleverly connected to his section on Religion and art in which he shows how in the beginning religion and art are seen as together, and then later in time when art begins to have its own distinct categories and becomes a study for the academics, religion no longer is in dialogue with it. He goes on to clarify that religion becomes irrational in the eyes of the aesthetic academic and vice versa. This idea of what is irrational and rational clearly plays a role in the evolution of social conventions. I believe he attempts to illustrate that with secularism religion becomes more irrational. As a result he highlights how religion and aesthetics once attached are collapsed as a result of historical processes. What becomes religious is no longer aesthetics and vice versa.
Lastly, his discussion of women is very intriguing. Weber discusses how women were in fact the cause of sexual energies because if they were not created then man in fact would not feel sexual urges (this he illustrates in a negative light). If in fact this is the case then there should have been no reason why women were looked down upon in society today. More specifically, Weber gives sexual energies a positive twist in his article by relating it to religious goals and experiences. One could simply say that women then were the very cause of religion because they gave off the energy needed for a heightened religious experience.
There is only one predominant question in my mind. In Weber’s article, it seems that religion and aesthetics are a part of a specific formula or has a specific structure, what happens when this structure collapses? In other words, what shifts would we see in these terms? Would they be different from its primitive meanings or the same?
Quick Note: Good Luck to everybody in their future endeavors!
The Murti of Beauty in the West
I found the information provided in the two readings from “the Blackwell Guide to Aesthetics” reader was very interesting, although they were at times rather difficult to fully grasp. The Guyer article was particularly dense and difficult to understand. Still many of the theorists which were mentioned had some fascinating ideas. Compared to Wolterstorff, Guyer really did not spend a lot of time explicitly discussing how religion and aesthetics really do tie together, yet he did make mentions of a few interesting theological theories.
The most interesting and relevant passage I felt is found on page 24. In this passage Guyer discusses Shaftsbury and his follower Hutcheson’s ideas of how art can be viewed as a means to God. Shaftesbusy argued that “our feeling of beauty is a direct perception of the overarching order of the universe established by its intelligent author.” Hutcheson - a more pious Christian than even Shaftsbury yet ultimately a secular and modern thinker– “argues that it is precisely the distinction between the sense of beauty on the one hand and cognition and volition on the other that grounds a proof of God’s benevolence...” (Guyer 24) It appears as those these thinkers found proof for a higher being – a creator and apparently a lover of things beautiful – in the existence of art and our ability to enjoy it as well as think about it. Although I do not find this to be proof of anything myself, I think it is a beautiful idea. The god they imagined must be good, intelligent, and loving, or else he would not have allowed such wondrous things to exist in his created world.
I am not sure exactly why but this really made me think of theories around the golden ratio - the magic, aesthetically pleasing number (phi - 1.6180339887) that can be found over and over again in nature. Most natural objects that have patterns follow the ratio (ex. sunflower seed formations) and the human body itself has its foundations in these proportions. During the Renaissance in particular, artists such as da Vinci utilized this number in their own creations. Many have questioned if this number is evidence for intelligent design or an in intelligent creator. (I am no expert in this and only have a brief passing interest –but I also wonder if people have used this theory to justify their belief that the creator made humans in their image...) I believe here is a body of Renaissance literature on the subject of the aesthetics of phi, I wonder if Shaftsbury had this in mind when he was talking of the overarching order of the universe as proof of an intelligent creator. Sound as though he did to me.
I was glad when reading the Wolterstorff article that similar topics such as finding the creator through art were emphasised. I actually quite enjoyed this reading (I also enjoyed the Weber article, but won’t talk about it here!). According to Bell, art is “kin” to religion, it is a “means to ecstasy” (Bell quoted on Woterstorff 327) I found it fascinating how the enjoyment of art was described in mystical terms. This follows so closely to a lot of the Indian writings we have spent so much time in class focusing on! Plotinus’ theories were very interesting. Things that have no perceptually different parts are some of the things that are inherently beautiful, in his opinion. This opposes the Pythagorean-Platonic belief that held that beautiful things were made up of parts – although Plotinus does work within this tradition. I think this goes back to the theory of phi which I talked about above; the parts follow a pattern and create a beautiful whole. Yet Plotinus is more advaita, the ultimate importance to him is unity. The soul, in unity with its “kindred reality, is delighted and thrilled and returns to itself and remembers itself and its own possessions” (I.6.2 quoted in Wolterstorff 329) According to Plotinus “beauty rests upon the material things when it has been brought into unity.” Furthermore, “the soul’s becoming something good and beautiful is its being made like to God, because from him [comes] beauty.” (I.6.6 quoted ibid.) All this sounds very mystical and similar to the Upanisadic and advaita “atman = Brahman”. I think I like Plotinus. According to Wolterstorff (ph 330) Plotinus was working with the Platonic idea in which things are beautiful because of their resemblance to and participation in the ultimate form of Beauty – the divine One, God. Although Bell’s ideas are based on a similar tradition to these, for him, God – the ultimate reality – is pantheistically manifested in form. So, from what I can gleam, for the former beautiful objects only resemble God (Wolterstorff himself holds similar beliefs), yet for the latter beautiful objects have God within them. Bell’s idea is highly reminiscent of Hindu ideas of murti for me!
The most interesting and relevant passage I felt is found on page 24. In this passage Guyer discusses Shaftsbury and his follower Hutcheson’s ideas of how art can be viewed as a means to God. Shaftesbusy argued that “our feeling of beauty is a direct perception of the overarching order of the universe established by its intelligent author.” Hutcheson - a more pious Christian than even Shaftsbury yet ultimately a secular and modern thinker– “argues that it is precisely the distinction between the sense of beauty on the one hand and cognition and volition on the other that grounds a proof of God’s benevolence...” (Guyer 24) It appears as those these thinkers found proof for a higher being – a creator and apparently a lover of things beautiful – in the existence of art and our ability to enjoy it as well as think about it. Although I do not find this to be proof of anything myself, I think it is a beautiful idea. The god they imagined must be good, intelligent, and loving, or else he would not have allowed such wondrous things to exist in his created world.
I am not sure exactly why but this really made me think of theories around the golden ratio - the magic, aesthetically pleasing number (phi - 1.6180339887) that can be found over and over again in nature. Most natural objects that have patterns follow the ratio (ex. sunflower seed formations) and the human body itself has its foundations in these proportions. During the Renaissance in particular, artists such as da Vinci utilized this number in their own creations. Many have questioned if this number is evidence for intelligent design or an in intelligent creator. (I am no expert in this and only have a brief passing interest –but I also wonder if people have used this theory to justify their belief that the creator made humans in their image...) I believe here is a body of Renaissance literature on the subject of the aesthetics of phi, I wonder if Shaftsbury had this in mind when he was talking of the overarching order of the universe as proof of an intelligent creator. Sound as though he did to me.
I was glad when reading the Wolterstorff article that similar topics such as finding the creator through art were emphasised. I actually quite enjoyed this reading (I also enjoyed the Weber article, but won’t talk about it here!). According to Bell, art is “kin” to religion, it is a “means to ecstasy” (Bell quoted on Woterstorff 327) I found it fascinating how the enjoyment of art was described in mystical terms. This follows so closely to a lot of the Indian writings we have spent so much time in class focusing on! Plotinus’ theories were very interesting. Things that have no perceptually different parts are some of the things that are inherently beautiful, in his opinion. This opposes the Pythagorean-Platonic belief that held that beautiful things were made up of parts – although Plotinus does work within this tradition. I think this goes back to the theory of phi which I talked about above; the parts follow a pattern and create a beautiful whole. Yet Plotinus is more advaita, the ultimate importance to him is unity. The soul, in unity with its “kindred reality, is delighted and thrilled and returns to itself and remembers itself and its own possessions” (I.6.2 quoted in Wolterstorff 329) According to Plotinus “beauty rests upon the material things when it has been brought into unity.” Furthermore, “the soul’s becoming something good and beautiful is its being made like to God, because from him [comes] beauty.” (I.6.6 quoted ibid.) All this sounds very mystical and similar to the Upanisadic and advaita “atman = Brahman”. I think I like Plotinus. According to Wolterstorff (ph 330) Plotinus was working with the Platonic idea in which things are beautiful because of their resemblance to and participation in the ultimate form of Beauty – the divine One, God. Although Bell’s ideas are based on a similar tradition to these, for him, God – the ultimate reality – is pantheistically manifested in form. So, from what I can gleam, for the former beautiful objects only resemble God (Wolterstorff himself holds similar beliefs), yet for the latter beautiful objects have God within them. Bell’s idea is highly reminiscent of Hindu ideas of murti for me!
Beauty: in the "I" of the Beholder
I comment here on Nicholas Wolterstorff’s chapter, “Art and the Aesthetic: The Religious Dimension”. I agree with Wolterstorff that Clive Bell’s deconstruction (in his book on aesthetic theory, “Art”, 1914) of the aesthetic experience bears an unmistakeably resemblance to discourse on religious experiencing, where upon contemplating the form of an object of beauty one approaches “the most valuable think in the world”, “a gift beyond all price”, that which “might prove [to be] the world’s salvation”, lifting us “above the stream of life” to behold “the thing in itself…[or]…the ultimate reality”. Apparently this ultimate reality reveals itself to us (or at least those of us “sensitive” enough to detect it) via the forms of beauty, thereby becoming a “product of the spiritual life”. The ecstasy of art-beholder is thereby associable with the ecstatic of the mystic: each experiencing the same height through different vehicles. Furthermore, I personally agree with Bell’s association of religion and art. This pairing strike two chords in me, resonating with a) the use of yantras and b) Sigmund Freud’s sentiments in “Civilization and Its Discontents”.
Bell’s emphasis of the supremacy of form (over content) in object of beauty may be applied to the existence and usage of yantras. These sacred diagrams of ancient India can contain theological content (depicting gods, planets, etc.), but typically consist of nothing more than an intricate panoply of interlocking geometrical shapes. These diagrams are based on form, since they don’t depict anything particular. Although they are quite beautiful, they are not meant merely as artistic expressions of beauty. Rather, they are considered tools for spiritual experiencing and growth. To contemplate such anobject of beauty is believed to enhance one’s awareness of metaphysical states of reality. As such yantras appears to be in alignment with Bell’s sentiments hat objects of beauty a) derive their appeal due to formal qualities, and b) are conducive to apprehending spiritual realities states of consciousness.
I enjoy the ideas advanced by the ancient Greek thinkers. I am very interested in the Pythagorean-Platonic answer to Polonius question regarding the connection between the nature of beauty as intertwined with its potency to cause delight. I hope we tease this out in class. But for now, I wish to tie engage only in modern secular accounts of beauty. I personally disagree with Kant’s secular account of aesthetic delight (pleasure in beauty) ascribing beauty’s appeal to nothing more than the free play of the cognitive faculties. As Bell points out, such a model does not begin to address the “strange mysterious feeling of exaltation” experienced while engaged by fine works of art, music, poetry, dance, etc. Sigmund Freud, too, was a secularist extraordinaire. In his brilliant exposition “Civilization and Its Discontents” he reduces divinity to psychological projection – god, of course, represents our need for a father figure (I’m not sure what he would say about polytheists and monists). In his analysis of the tension between the needs of the individual and the demands of Civilization he sternly critiques religion’s ability to safeguard happiness and morality for humanity. He ultimately pits religion against science, arguing that it’s a ancient farce, born of sociological and psychological necessity, which, as scientifically-minded individuals, we out to intellectually outgrow. Freud is therefore firmly entrenched in the physical world and thus could not begin to appreciate the subtle eview of aesthetics advanced by Platonius, Bell, etc. What does he say about beauty?
Sigmund Freud is as opinionated as he is brilliant. He has many insights to share on the human experience – regarding emotion, mind, motivation, sensation, family, desire, etc – yet he, too, seems baffled by the origin and appreciation of beauty. He writes (in Civilization and Its Discontents) that
"the enjoyment of beauty has a peculiar, mildly intoxication quality of feeling. Beauty has no obvious use; nor is there any clear cultural necessity for it. Yet civilization could not do without it. The science of aesthetics investigates the conditions under which things are felt as beautiful, but it has been unable to give any explanation of the nature and origin of beauty, and, as usually happens, lack of success is concealed beneath a flood of resounding and empty words. Psychoanalysis, unfortunately, has scarcely anything to say about beauty either."
Ironically, I think Freud’s bewilderment on the subject is quite telling. He find no viable physical, psychological account for beauty simply because it is born and enjoyed in a realm beyond the rational intellect, and perhaps, as Bell would assert, mirrors a reality transcendent to the physical world. Metaphysical speculation aside, Freud does seem to assent to beauty’s power, i.e., it’s peculiar, intoxicating effect. He is unable to reduce it to a matter of utility, admitting that it has no obvious use. He further admits that there is a clear cultural need for it. I would expand this, given the global appeal of beauty, to say that there is s clear human need for beauty. Ironically, Freud’s inability to account for beauty on secular terms may serve to signify the transcendence inherent in beauty. He seems one step ahead of the thinkers who do purport to account for beauty on rational terms. Freud may dismiss religion, but in doing so, he can’t account for beauty, because, as Bell would argue, they are indeed both twin manifestations of the same impulse, and as such both “roads by which men escape from circumstance to ecstasy”.
Thanks for reading, and for all of the wonderful feedback and discussion this semester.
Regards,
Raj
Bell’s emphasis of the supremacy of form (over content) in object of beauty may be applied to the existence and usage of yantras. These sacred diagrams of ancient India can contain theological content (depicting gods, planets, etc.), but typically consist of nothing more than an intricate panoply of interlocking geometrical shapes. These diagrams are based on form, since they don’t depict anything particular. Although they are quite beautiful, they are not meant merely as artistic expressions of beauty. Rather, they are considered tools for spiritual experiencing and growth. To contemplate such anobject of beauty is believed to enhance one’s awareness of metaphysical states of reality. As such yantras appears to be in alignment with Bell’s sentiments hat objects of beauty a) derive their appeal due to formal qualities, and b) are conducive to apprehending spiritual realities states of consciousness.
I enjoy the ideas advanced by the ancient Greek thinkers. I am very interested in the Pythagorean-Platonic answer to Polonius question regarding the connection between the nature of beauty as intertwined with its potency to cause delight. I hope we tease this out in class. But for now, I wish to tie engage only in modern secular accounts of beauty. I personally disagree with Kant’s secular account of aesthetic delight (pleasure in beauty) ascribing beauty’s appeal to nothing more than the free play of the cognitive faculties. As Bell points out, such a model does not begin to address the “strange mysterious feeling of exaltation” experienced while engaged by fine works of art, music, poetry, dance, etc. Sigmund Freud, too, was a secularist extraordinaire. In his brilliant exposition “Civilization and Its Discontents” he reduces divinity to psychological projection – god, of course, represents our need for a father figure (I’m not sure what he would say about polytheists and monists). In his analysis of the tension between the needs of the individual and the demands of Civilization he sternly critiques religion’s ability to safeguard happiness and morality for humanity. He ultimately pits religion against science, arguing that it’s a ancient farce, born of sociological and psychological necessity, which, as scientifically-minded individuals, we out to intellectually outgrow. Freud is therefore firmly entrenched in the physical world and thus could not begin to appreciate the subtle eview of aesthetics advanced by Platonius, Bell, etc. What does he say about beauty?
Sigmund Freud is as opinionated as he is brilliant. He has many insights to share on the human experience – regarding emotion, mind, motivation, sensation, family, desire, etc – yet he, too, seems baffled by the origin and appreciation of beauty. He writes (in Civilization and Its Discontents) that
"the enjoyment of beauty has a peculiar, mildly intoxication quality of feeling. Beauty has no obvious use; nor is there any clear cultural necessity for it. Yet civilization could not do without it. The science of aesthetics investigates the conditions under which things are felt as beautiful, but it has been unable to give any explanation of the nature and origin of beauty, and, as usually happens, lack of success is concealed beneath a flood of resounding and empty words. Psychoanalysis, unfortunately, has scarcely anything to say about beauty either."
Ironically, I think Freud’s bewilderment on the subject is quite telling. He find no viable physical, psychological account for beauty simply because it is born and enjoyed in a realm beyond the rational intellect, and perhaps, as Bell would assert, mirrors a reality transcendent to the physical world. Metaphysical speculation aside, Freud does seem to assent to beauty’s power, i.e., it’s peculiar, intoxicating effect. He is unable to reduce it to a matter of utility, admitting that it has no obvious use. He further admits that there is a clear cultural need for it. I would expand this, given the global appeal of beauty, to say that there is s clear human need for beauty. Ironically, Freud’s inability to account for beauty on secular terms may serve to signify the transcendence inherent in beauty. He seems one step ahead of the thinkers who do purport to account for beauty on rational terms. Freud may dismiss religion, but in doing so, he can’t account for beauty, because, as Bell would argue, they are indeed both twin manifestations of the same impulse, and as such both “roads by which men escape from circumstance to ecstasy”.
Thanks for reading, and for all of the wonderful feedback and discussion this semester.
Regards,
Raj
Monday, April 7, 2008
Aesthetic Theories
This weeks readings were somewhat tedious. It required a lot of strenuous brain activity, and yet I still feel like I have no clue what aesthetic theories are. With that said, in this blog it could be a possibility that I am distorting the true meanings of these theories so I am attempting to try to understand these theories.
Du Bos’ theory sparked a great deal of interest because we discussed this issue in class in the form of a question: How do we receive pleasure from movies that are sad? Does this not cause pain which is an awful feeling, and not pleasurable in the least bit? According to Du Bos our imagination is so powerful that it has the “capacity to stir emotions by means of representations/ imitations, rather than by beliefs held to be true. (7)” His argument follows the logic that passions are the main thrust of enjoyment and excitement without them humanity would be doomed to boredom (and we all know this is not the greatest feeling). What artform does is imitate these passions to ignite the passion in the audience, which is superficial because it does not imply the real pain and sadness experienced in the real world in association with real objects. What is the difference between the real world and the superficial imitated world? The answer is duration the feeling lasts only for a limited time when attending a movie and leaves you as soon as you leave it. It is restricted to a certain space and time. That is why the whole experience is pleasurable because the imagination is able to connect with the “superficialness” of the events played out and is able to be free from feeling these emotions that are not permanent. What happens when a movie hits really close to home? The events depicted are so real to an individual than does this theory work? I believe that the pain is ignited and lasts for a much longer duration and in this case the events that take place in the movies cannot be separated from real life, and the result is pain. The individual in this case would not return to the movies.
Wolterstorff ‘s article specifically lays out Bell’s argument on the interrelatedness of religion and art. He describes religious experience as one of the same as aesthetic experience. What is the cause of this experience? According to him it is form. What is interesting about this argument is that kavya was nothing close to religious. As a matter of fact its purpose was totally different. It was solely for the purpose of enjoyment and was not structured by certain rituals, people attended dramas and read poetry for specifically this reason and not for religious reasons. The reason why religion was infused into kavya and drama was because religion and the state were inseparable. Religion was “markers” of identity for the audience attending drama and reading poetry. They were symbols and signs that they could easily relate to making the experience enjoyable and exciting.
Another interesting theme presented in the article is that of good and bad. It is interesting that Bell would say that we experience beauty because artwork is related to all things good and thus, being a product of God. Don’t we experience beauty in all things ugly and dark as well because of its uniqueness? Are these things associated with the devil? It’s funny that most religions stress this duality, but ultimately they preach that all things are unified.
Du Bos’ theory sparked a great deal of interest because we discussed this issue in class in the form of a question: How do we receive pleasure from movies that are sad? Does this not cause pain which is an awful feeling, and not pleasurable in the least bit? According to Du Bos our imagination is so powerful that it has the “capacity to stir emotions by means of representations/ imitations, rather than by beliefs held to be true. (7)” His argument follows the logic that passions are the main thrust of enjoyment and excitement without them humanity would be doomed to boredom (and we all know this is not the greatest feeling). What artform does is imitate these passions to ignite the passion in the audience, which is superficial because it does not imply the real pain and sadness experienced in the real world in association with real objects. What is the difference between the real world and the superficial imitated world? The answer is duration the feeling lasts only for a limited time when attending a movie and leaves you as soon as you leave it. It is restricted to a certain space and time. That is why the whole experience is pleasurable because the imagination is able to connect with the “superficialness” of the events played out and is able to be free from feeling these emotions that are not permanent. What happens when a movie hits really close to home? The events depicted are so real to an individual than does this theory work? I believe that the pain is ignited and lasts for a much longer duration and in this case the events that take place in the movies cannot be separated from real life, and the result is pain. The individual in this case would not return to the movies.
Wolterstorff ‘s article specifically lays out Bell’s argument on the interrelatedness of religion and art. He describes religious experience as one of the same as aesthetic experience. What is the cause of this experience? According to him it is form. What is interesting about this argument is that kavya was nothing close to religious. As a matter of fact its purpose was totally different. It was solely for the purpose of enjoyment and was not structured by certain rituals, people attended dramas and read poetry for specifically this reason and not for religious reasons. The reason why religion was infused into kavya and drama was because religion and the state were inseparable. Religion was “markers” of identity for the audience attending drama and reading poetry. They were symbols and signs that they could easily relate to making the experience enjoyable and exciting.
Another interesting theme presented in the article is that of good and bad. It is interesting that Bell would say that we experience beauty because artwork is related to all things good and thus, being a product of God. Don’t we experience beauty in all things ugly and dark as well because of its uniqueness? Are these things associated with the devil? It’s funny that most religions stress this duality, but ultimately they preach that all things are unified.
Wednesday, March 26, 2008
Living Memory, Performing History
The main area of research that I intend to focus on in graduate school is the sexuality of women and the burden’s placed on it. Albeit I intend to study the Christian West, the Davesh Soneji article was absolute treat to read for me.
By focusing only on the five remaining devdasi’s of the Ballipadu Madanagopalasvami Temple in Andhra Pradesh, Soneji puts a human face on an otherwise vast (and dare I say, dying) tradition.
For these women, Soneji argues that, their identity is incumbent upon their memories of who they used to be – they tradition, their ritual temple roles, their diminished status, and finally their currently isolated and declining position in society. He believes that these devdasis use nostalgia to elaborate upon their past identity – thus using wist and memory to forge a present-day identity for themselves (31).
I find Soneji’s comment about the umbrella term interesting – he holds that the Sanskrit term “devdasi” that is used as an overarching term for temple women in various parts of South India is a Colonial attempt at categorizing data for these communities (32). I think about the term “Hindu” as a parallel to this idea because much in the same way, Colonial attempts to neatly categorize the religious identities of Indians resulted in this faultily categorized seemingly homogenous ‘religion’!
In the new-age ‘performances’ of the devdasis interviewed by Soneji, the bhogam melams take place behind closed doors (for fear of persecution and because they’re prohibited in their traditional venue of the temple). Which makes me question whether or not an audience is a prerequisite for a performance. Soneji believes no. However, I am forced to ask about the tree in the forest making a sound if no one is around to hear it…is this lack of audience presence simple a newer facet of the devdasi’s tradition – brought about by an actual lack of audience rather than the desire to dance away from a viewer’s gaze? This question is brought about by what Soneji himself puts forth on page 34 – that the most prominent feature of the devdasi “performance culture” was the concert repertory (kacceri).
For me, the most interesting parts of this article were those that dealt with death and sex pollution. In other cultures that I have studied – including the Newari Buddhists of Nepal, the Nayari and Tiyyari cultures of the Indian Malabar Coast, and the native peoples of the New Guinea Highlands, sex- and death-pollution become the cause and effect of female sexuality. Thus to see that amongst the devdasis of the article, there is no pollution observation, was not only a little unusual but also liberating in a way!
The lack of menstrual pollution as well as the matrilocal organization of these women makes me ask if this society is also matriarchal. Soneji does not allude to this in his article.
If the dances are forced underground, and the mudras (hand gestures) are outlawed, and the songs are deemed as lewd, what then identifies a devdasi as such? Is it simply her memory as Soneji suggests? This is a sad notion indeed – that for the devdasi, who she is, is who she was. However, as Soneji concludes, while these acts of memory serve no societal purpose, they prove effective at the level of individual identity (44).
By focusing only on the five remaining devdasi’s of the Ballipadu Madanagopalasvami Temple in Andhra Pradesh, Soneji puts a human face on an otherwise vast (and dare I say, dying) tradition.
For these women, Soneji argues that, their identity is incumbent upon their memories of who they used to be – they tradition, their ritual temple roles, their diminished status, and finally their currently isolated and declining position in society. He believes that these devdasis use nostalgia to elaborate upon their past identity – thus using wist and memory to forge a present-day identity for themselves (31).
I find Soneji’s comment about the umbrella term interesting – he holds that the Sanskrit term “devdasi” that is used as an overarching term for temple women in various parts of South India is a Colonial attempt at categorizing data for these communities (32). I think about the term “Hindu” as a parallel to this idea because much in the same way, Colonial attempts to neatly categorize the religious identities of Indians resulted in this faultily categorized seemingly homogenous ‘religion’!
In the new-age ‘performances’ of the devdasis interviewed by Soneji, the bhogam melams take place behind closed doors (for fear of persecution and because they’re prohibited in their traditional venue of the temple). Which makes me question whether or not an audience is a prerequisite for a performance. Soneji believes no. However, I am forced to ask about the tree in the forest making a sound if no one is around to hear it…is this lack of audience presence simple a newer facet of the devdasi’s tradition – brought about by an actual lack of audience rather than the desire to dance away from a viewer’s gaze? This question is brought about by what Soneji himself puts forth on page 34 – that the most prominent feature of the devdasi “performance culture” was the concert repertory (kacceri).
For me, the most interesting parts of this article were those that dealt with death and sex pollution. In other cultures that I have studied – including the Newari Buddhists of Nepal, the Nayari and Tiyyari cultures of the Indian Malabar Coast, and the native peoples of the New Guinea Highlands, sex- and death-pollution become the cause and effect of female sexuality. Thus to see that amongst the devdasis of the article, there is no pollution observation, was not only a little unusual but also liberating in a way!
The lack of menstrual pollution as well as the matrilocal organization of these women makes me ask if this society is also matriarchal. Soneji does not allude to this in his article.
If the dances are forced underground, and the mudras (hand gestures) are outlawed, and the songs are deemed as lewd, what then identifies a devdasi as such? Is it simply her memory as Soneji suggests? This is a sad notion indeed – that for the devdasi, who she is, is who she was. However, as Soneji concludes, while these acts of memory serve no societal purpose, they prove effective at the level of individual identity (44).
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